Summary_Reader Response Draft #3

In the article "Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno", Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that a series of flaws in building regulations had made the occupants of Grenfell helpless during the massive fire. Firstly, the government did not have regular review on building regulations. The last revision was implemented in 1986 by the National Buildings Regulations. However, it did not specify if external building materials had to be non-combustible. At Grenfell, the cladding used was unsafe because it had contained combustible materials. Furthermore, Knapton and Dixon (2017) stated that spaces in between the cladding helped the fire to extend to the levels above. The fire was also able to spread to other areas as fire doors were not installed. Firebreaks were deemed ineffective in a fire like Grenfell. The absence of a central sprinkler system made the upper levels more vulnerable as the fire hoses were not long enough. Moreover, the only staircase in the building was obstructed and filled with smoke. The lack of clarity in the fire risk assessment regulations also played a part.

While the article explained the contributing factors to the disaster at Grenfell Tower, it failed to mention the London Fire Brigade response to the situation. The fire brigade was partly responsible for leaving the residents of Grenfell at the mercy of the massive fire.

Firstly, the fire brigade was slow in decision making. In the article "Grenfell Tower: What happened" (2018), it was reported that one of the fire experts from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry claimed that the ‘stay put’ policy had significantly failed at 1.26am which was about half an hour after the arrival of the first firefighters. This meant that the initial plan for fire containment within the apartment had failed and the fire had spread to other parts of the building. However, the fire brigade took more than an hour to abandon the ‘stay put’ fire policy and start evacuating residents. The decision time was crucial for the residents in escaping. As time passed, smoke started infiltrating the stairway making it harder for an escape to happen. If the fire brigade had been able to come out with the decision quicker, the residents would not be left helpless in their apartments.

The fire brigade was also disorganized in responding to the situation. One of the survivors claimed to have witnessed bigger fire engines with high ladder being unable to go nearer to the building as the road were blocked by smaller fire engines that had arrived earlier (Mendick, 2018). It was surprising to know that bigger fire engines with high ladder were not immediately activated to fire situations at high rise buildings like Grenfell. The general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union mentioned the importance of an aerial appliance arriving first at the scene due to the strong supply of water it could provide (Sawer, 2017). This meant that there could have been a possibility of the fire being controlled from spreading to the entire building if the aerial appliance had responded to the fire earlier which may help to avoid the apartment fire from turning into a disaster.

The preparedness of the fire brigade was also in question. Booth (2018) stated that none of the firemen were taught on how to deal with cladding fires even when the issue had been surfaced within the organization. This meant that the firemen were fighting a fire they knew little about and may endanger themselves as well as the lives of the residents if they did not manage the cladding fires properly. If the firemen had been equipped with knowledge and skills in fighting cladding fires, more lives could have been rescued from the incident.

The flaws in building regulations may have left the residents of Grenfell helpless in the massive fire. We cannot exclude the role that the London Fire Brigade had played in the incident which was equally as important. If the fire brigade had better protocols for managing building fires, the fire at Grenfell Tower would have a less severe outcome.

References

Booth, R. (2018). Grenfell Tower inquiry: what we've learned so far. The Guardian. Retrieved, December 13, 2018 from
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/13/grenfell-tower-inquiry-what-weve-learned-so-far

Grenfell Tower: What happened (2018). BBC. Retrieved, June 18, 2018 from 

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40301289

Mendick, R. (2018). The Grenfell Tower survivors: Lucky to escape, but living with the horror of what they saw. The Telegraph. Retrieved, May 24, 2018 from 

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/24/grenfell-tower-survivors-lucky-escape-living-horror-saw/

Sawer, P. (2017). Grenfell Tower firefighters 'hampered' by equipment faults and delays. The Telegraph. Retrieved, July 8, 2017 from
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/08/grenfell-tower-firefighters-hampered-equipment-faults-delays/

Edited on 10/04/2019 10.55pm